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Abstract
We investigated the inﬂ uence of humiliation on inter-group conﬂ ict in three studies of Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and Gaza. We demonstrate that experienced humiliation produces an 
inertia eﬀ ect; a tendency towards inaction that suppresses rebellious or violent action but which 
paradoxically also suppresses support for acts of inter-group compromise. In Study 1, Palestinians 
who felt more humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less likely to support suicide attacks 
against Israelis. In Study 2, priming Palestinians with a humiliating experience caused fewer 
expressions of joy when subsequently hearing about suicide attacks. In Study 3, Palestinians who 
felt more humiliated by peace deals were less likely to support those deals, while Israeli symbolic 
compromises that decreased feelings of humiliation increased support for the same deals. While 
the experience of humiliation does not seem to contribute to political violence, it does seem to 
suppress support for conﬂ ict resolution.
Keywords
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“Th ey [the United States] have attacked our brothers in Palestine as they have attacked Arabs 
and Muslims elsewhere. Th e blood of Muslims is shed. It has become too much. . . . We are only 
looked upon as sheep, and we are very humiliated.”
Osama Bin Laden (cited by Wright, 2006, p. 150)
Th e humiliation and subjugation of other groups is a terrible feature of human 
political life. As the above quote indicates, humiliation is often thought to be 
a signiﬁ cant cause of inter-group violence. Humiliation has been used to help 
explain the aggression of Nazi Germany following the Versailles treaty (e.g., 
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Lindner, 2006) and the violence of non-state actors, such as suicide bombers 
(Jurgensmeyer, 2000; Atran, 2003; Stern, 2003; Moghadam, 2006; Newman, 
2006; Sen, 2006; Bergen and Lind, 2007). Th e idea that humiliation leads to 
reactive violence has strong roots in psychoanalytic theory (Steinberg, 1991) 
and has substantial anecdotal support (Hassan, 2007). For example, in inter-
views that we and others have conducted, members of diﬀ erent militant groups 
often attribute their own violent acts to personal or collective humiliation expe-
rienced at the hands of their oppressors (Atran and Stern, 2005; Fontan, 2006). 
Despite the importance of the topic, empirical tests of the role of humiliation in 
inﬂ uencing violent intractable conﬂ ict are rare (Victoroﬀ , 2005). Th e research 
discussed in this paper was intended to ﬁ ll this gap.
Any discussion of humiliation is limited by the paucity of empirical inves-
tigation into its qualities. A ﬁ rst step is to examine cross cultural appearances 
of the word humiliation and attend to their literal meanings. “Humiliation” is 
derived from the Latin humiliatus (made to lose pride or self-respect) from 
humilis (low, humble) and from humus (dirt, earth). As an indication of its 
importance, we have yet to ﬁ nd a language where there is no literal translation 
of the English word humiliation. Words for humiliation in other languages 
such as, Chinese, Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, Russian, Polish, German and Hungar-
ian contain these same connotations (relative lowering of social status, pride 
and self-respect, being lowered to the dirt). Th is literal description of humili-
ation resonates in speculations regarding the characteristics of humiliation 
within the psychological literature. Humiliation is thought to belong to the 
family of self conscious (Tangney and Fischer, 1995) and moral (Margarit, 
2002) emotions such as shame and pride. Humiliation is generally considered 
to be a feeling of being unjustly demeaned, devalued or subjugated by anoth-
er’s actions in a social context (Hartling and Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002) 
in a manner that evokes “. . . a deep dysphoric feeling of inferiority” (Coleman 
et al., 2007). Th e constant in this discussion is that being humiliated is associ-
ated with a loss of power in a public context. In this paper we propose that an 
outcome of this loss of power is an inertia eﬀ ect; a tendency towards inaction 
that, in contrast to assumptions discussed at the outset of the paper, actually 
suppresses rebellious or violent action but which also suppresses mutually-
beneﬁ cial compromises to inter-group conﬂ icts.
Leaders of violent insurgent groups from Red Army Brigades to Fatah and 
the Lehi have long argued that passivism born by humiliation decreases the 
prospects of popular rebellion (Ginges, 1997) unless the oppressed are “illu-
minated by violence” (Fanon, 1967). As many insurgent leaders supposed, 
power is positively associated with the agency (Keltner et al., 2003) necessary 
to planned acts of rebellion, violent or otherwise. Positions and perceptions of 
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being in relatively high power is negatively associated with perspective taking 
(Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2006) that might inhibit violence and is posi-
tively associated with a variety of aggressive behaviors (Keltner et al., 2001; 
Studd, 1996). In contrast, positions or perceptions of being in relatively low 
power is associated with inhibited behaviors (Ellyson and Dovidio, 1985; More-
land and Levine, 1989; Keltner et al., 1998; Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999).
While it should be noted that insults can cause violent reactions, particu-
larly in so-called honor based societies (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996), the attempt 
to insult or humiliate is not equivalent to the psychological experience of being 
insulted or humiliated. In fact, the extent to which insult leads to violent reac-
tions is moderated by narcissism which is positively associated with power 
(Campbell et al., 2007). People who score low on narcissism scales are no more 
likely to be aggressive in response to insult than to praise; high narcissism seems 
necessary for insult to lead to aggression (Bushman and Baumeister, 1998). 
Because narcissists show high agentic self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2007) and 
are less likely than others to internalize insults (Campbell et al., 2004), these 
results imply that it is those who are least likely to feel humiliated by an insult 
who are most likely to respond with aggression. In short, there is reason to 
doubt whether humiliating people and thus degrading their power is likely to 
cause violent reaction. Rather, it appears likely that humiliation may actually 
suppress violence. Our primary goal in the research we described here was to 
evaluate the relationship between humiliation and political violence.
We propose that the inertia eﬀ ect that follows humiliation has a second 
consequence relevant to understanding inter-group conﬂ ict. Humiliation, iron-
ically, may also suppress support for mutually beneﬁ cial compromise to inter-
group conﬂ icts. People will often irrationally resist compromising over values 
they deem sacred such as “holy” land (Tetlock, 2003; Ginges et al., 2007). We 
hypothesized that people experience a request to compromise a “sacred value” 
as humiliating, an experience that suppresses willingness to act in support for 
mutually beneﬁ cial peace deals. Th is may lead to intractable conﬂ ict, because 
compromising over such values is often a key component in peace deals. If 
humiliation suppresses support for political compromise, it follows that eﬀ orts 
to decrease humiliation will increase the prospects of support for the same 
compromise. Previously we have shown that violent opposition to such com-
promises can be reduced if the other party makes simultaneous symbolic com-
promises over one of their own sacred values (Ginges et al., 2007; Atran, Axelrod 
and Davis, 2007). Here we investigated whether such symbolic compromises 
might reduce the inertia eﬀ ect of humiliation and in doing so increase popular 
support for diﬃ  cult but beneﬁ cial political compromise.
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Overview of Research
We investigated these predictions in two large-scale surveys of Muslim Pales-
tinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Th e ﬁ rst survey was of a represen-
tative sample carried out in December 2005. Th e second survey was of a 
sample of university students carried out in May 2006. We chose this popula-
tion for three reasons. First, Palestinian society is an honor based society 
(PHRMG, 2002). Some emerging theories of a positive relationship between 
humiliation and political violence argue that humiliation is most likely to 
result in aggression in societies strongly concerned with issues of honor (e.g., 
Coleman et al., 2007). Th us testing our claim of a negative relationship between 
humiliation and violence in this population is particularly appropriate. Sec-
ond, investigating this population allowed us to examine issues directly rele-
vant to the Palestinian–Israeli conﬂ ict, one consistently rated as one of the 
greatest threats to world peace (Pew Research Center, 2006). Th ird, humilia-
tion has frequently been used to explain the use of suicide attacks amongst 
Palestinians (e.g., Stern, 2003). Below we describe three studies. Th e ﬁ rst two 
deal with the relationship between humiliation and political violence. Study 3 
then examines the hypothesized relationship between humiliation and conﬂ ict 
intractability.
Study 1: Humiliation Is Negatively Correlated with Support for Political 
Violence
In our ﬁ rst study, we investigated whether Palestinian support for suicide attacks 
against Israelis could be predicted by the degree to which Palestinians experi-
enced humiliation caused by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 
In November 2005 we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1264 
Muslim Palestinian adults living in the West Bank. Th e survey was conducted by 
the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), which con-
ducted face-to-face in the homes of participants. For a description of survey 
methodology see http://pcpsr.org. Th e refusal rate was < 5%. All materials were 
piloted to ensure transparency of meaning. Th e measures described in this paper 
were integrated within a larger survey of political and social attitudes and 
occurred in the ﬁ rst part of that survey.
Measures
Our predictor variable was experienced humiliation as a consequence of the 
Israeli occupation. In previous studies we have found that asking this popula-
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tion to rate the extent to which they feel an emotion along a semantic or 
numeric scale measure produces low variance. A more eﬀ ective measure is to 
ask participants to nominate out of a list of emotion words the word which 
best, and the word which second best, describes how they are feeling. In this 
study we asked participants: “Which of the following feelings/emotions come 
to mind when thinking about . . .” and we then listed seven potentially humil-
iating aspects of the Israeli occupation. Participants were asked to indicate 
their ﬁ rst and second emotional response to each aspect from the following 
list: sadness, dignity, humiliation, pride, oppression, justice, insult, fear, joy, 
anger, freedom, revenge, powerful, frustration, powerless. Table 1 lists the 
events we asked about and shows the percentage of our sample who responded 
with humiliation in each case. We constructed humiliation scores for each 
event by assigning a value of “2” if participants chose humiliation ﬁ rst, “1” if 
humiliation was chosen second, and a score of “0” if humiliation was not 
chosen. We then created a general humiliation scale by summing scores on 
individual humiliation scales. Scores on this last scale, “humiliation”, ranged 
from 0 to 10 (mean = 2.517, SD = 1.904).
Table 1
Humiliation of Palestinians. Percentage of Palestinians who reported feeling 
humiliated (as their ﬁ rst or second response) when thinking about aspects of the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
First 
response
Second 
response
People stand in line at checkpoints 47% 17%
Th e number of settlers increases all the time 6% 5%
Palestinian farmers are unable to reach their land 15% 10%
Th e wall encircles Palestinian land 11% 12%
Unemployment increases due to Israeli closures 9% 9%
Assassination of Palestinian activists 2% 3%
Demolition of Palestinian homes 6% 6%
We used three measures of support for suicide attacks against Israeli citizens. In 
the ﬁ rst measure, participants were asked to nominate their emotional responses 
to hearing of suicide attacks using the same list of possible emotional responses 
as above. Th e most common emotional response was “joy” (50% ﬁ rst response, 
12% second). Th e other common positive emotional response was “pride” 
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(12% ﬁ rst response, 13% second). For this measure, expression of “joy” was the 
criterion for a positive emotional response to suicide attacks, although we also 
examined “pride”. In the second measure, participants were asked what, in 
their opinion was the position of Islam regarding suicide attacks “that target 
civilians such as the bombing of a bus in an Israeli city?” Responses were coded 
on a “4” (certainly support) to “1” (certainly oppose) semantic scale (Mean = 
2.84, SD = 0.91). In the third measure, participants were asked what, in their 
opinion, was the position of Islam regarding the suicide bomber who kills 
“himself with the aim of killing his enemies as some Palestinians do. Does 
Islam certainly allow (coded “4”), allow (coded “3”), not allow (coded “2”), or 
certainly not allow (coded “1”) such action?” (mean = 3.04, SD = 0.79). Expres-
sions of joy when hearing about suicide bombing attacks were positively related 
to a belief that Islam supported suicide attacks in general (rSpearman = 0.21, P < 
0.001) and allowed the acts of suicide bombers (rSpearman = 0.2, P < 0.001). Pride 
was more weakly correlated with these same two dependent variables (rSpearman = 
0.11, P < 0.001; rSpearman = 0.12, P < 0.001).
Results
(1) Humiliation was negatively related to the expression of “joy” when hear-
ing of a suicide attack. Taking each potentially humiliating event separately, 
expressions of humiliation when thinking about checkpoints, the number of 
settlers growing and demolitions was negatively related to expressions of “joy 
at P < 0.05. An unreliable trend in the same direction was found for the other 
four events: farmers being unable to reach their land, the wall, loss of jobs, and 
assassinations. Looking at the overall humiliation score: a logistic regression 
showed that each increase in the humiliation score reduced the likelihood of a 
person expressing joy when hearing about suicide bombings by a multiplica-
tive factor of 0.935 (Wald = 4.951, 95% SI for Odds Ratio = 0.882–0.992, 
P = 0.026). Th is negative eﬀ ect of humiliation on support for suicide bomb-
ings is clearly seen when we compare people who scored high on the humilia-
tion scale (deﬁ ned by scoring at least 1 standard deviation above the mean) 
with others. Compared to other Palestinians, the predicted odds of ﬁ rst express-
ing “joy” when hearing of suicide attacks was lower by a factor of 0.598 for 
Palestinians who scored high on humiliation (Wald = 9.279, 95% CI on Odds 
Ratio = 0.429–0.832, P = 0.002). When controlling for gender, age, refugee 
status (refugee or not), education level, and whether participants opposition 
to compromise over the right of return was a “sacred value”, participants who 
expressed “joy” when hearing of suicide attacks still were less likely to score 
high on the humiliation scale (Wald = 7.208, 95% CI on Odds Ratio = 
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0.443–0.881, P = 0.007). Humiliation was unrelated to expressions of pride 
at bombing attacks (all P > 0.4).
(2) Humiliation was also negatively related to the second dependent vari-
able: multiple regression analysis found that Palestinians who scored high on 
humiliation scale scored lower on the scale measuring the belief that Islam 
supports the use of suicide attacks (B = −0.183, SE = .08, t = −2.271, P = 
0.023) Th is relationship was stable when we included the control variables 
listed above (P = 0.050).
(3) Humiliation was also negatively related to the third dependent variable 
(the belief that Islam allowed the actions of the suicide bomber), although this 
ﬁ nding was not statistically reliable (P = 0.246), possibly due to the lower vari-
ance on this item.
Summary
Study 1 found the predicted inertia eﬀ ect. Although the size of the negative 
eﬀ ect was small to moderate, it ran counter in each case to the notion that 
humiliation leads to reactive political aggression. Humiliation as a product of 
salient negative aspects of the Israeli occupation was never positively corre-
lated with support for suicide attacks. Instead it tended to negatively predict 
support for violence.
Study 2: Experiencing Humiliation Decreases Support for Suicide Attacks
Perhaps the strongest measure of support for an act political violence is the 
expression of joy when hearing about the act. In the second study, we exam-
ined the inertia eﬀ ect of humiliation further using a cognitive priming experi-
ment. Using a between subjects design we manipulated feelings of humiliation 
caused by the Israeli occupation and examined the eﬀ ect on expressions of joy 
when hearing about suicide attacks. Th e experiment was embedded in a sur-
vey of 720 Palestinian students, half of whom identiﬁ ed with Hamas or Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Th is is a particularly relevant sample as the majority 
of Palestinian suicide attackers have been student members of Hamas or PIJ. 
Th is survey was run by PCPSR in May 2006, and comprised face to face indi-
vidual interviews with participants across 14 campuses in the West Bank and 
Gaza. Th e study had equal numbers of men and women and the refusal rate 
was < 5%. We were interested in whether priming participants by reminding 
them of the most humiliating aspect of the Israeli occupation (standing in line 
at Israeli checkpoints, as found in Study 1) would inﬂ uence the likelihood of 
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them reporting feeling “joy” when hearing of bombing attacks. All partici-
pants were asked to report their emotional reactions to two of the events mea-
sured in Study 1: standing in line at checkpoints and hearing about suicide 
attacks. Th e wording of the items and the list of possible emotional responses 
were identical to those used in Study 1. We randomly manipulated the order 
of items: half of our participants were reminded of checkpoints before being 
asked about the suicide attacks, while the other half answered the question 
about suicide attacks ﬁ rst.
We predicted that the eﬀ ect of question order would be moderated by whether 
participants reported experiencing humiliation when reminded of people stand-
ing in line at checkpoints. We expected that for participants who reported 
humiliation when thinking about checkpoints, the checkpoint-suicide attack 
order would lead to fewer reports of “joy” when hearing about suicide attacks 
compared to the suicide attack-checkpoint order. Th at is, reminding partici-
pants of a humiliating event would reduce positive emotional responses to 
suicide attacks. In contrast, we expected that participants who did not report 
experiencing humiliation when reminded of suicide attacks would show no 
eﬀ ect of question order or the opposite eﬀ ect.
Results
Th e most common emotional response to standing in line at a checkpoint 
was humiliation (66%). Th e next most common response was insult (24%) 
followed by oppression (20%). Th e most common initial response to thinking 
of suicide attacks was “joy” (41%). Other common responses were “pride” 
(30%), and “sadness” (8%). Because “joy” was again the most prevalent response 
and because it showed the strongest relationship to cognitive measures of sup-
port for suicide attacks in Study 1, joy was our primary dependent variable, 
although we ran identical tests on pride.
As expected, the inﬂ uence of question order was moderated by whether or 
not participants reported feeling humiliated when standing in line at check-
points: Wald = 4.885, OR = 0.485 (95% CI = 0.255–0.921), P = 0.027. 
Participants who reported humiliation when thinking about checkpoints were 
less likely, by a factor of 0.589 (Wald = 6.903, 95% CI for Odds Ratio = 
0.407–0.871, P = 0.009) to report feeling “joy” as their ﬁ rst emotional response 
to hearing about a suicide attack if they had been previously reminded of 
standing in line at checkpoints. In contrast, participants who did not report 
experiencing humiliation when standing in line at checkpoints were not inﬂ u-
enced by question order (P = 0.425). Th e experimental manipulation did not 
inﬂ uence feelings of “pride” when hearing of suicide attacks (not signiﬁ cant).
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Summary
Reminding participants of an event that was experienced as humiliating reduced 
reports of joy when hearing about suicide attacks. Th is priming experiment 
replicates the correlational results in Study 1 where humiliation was negatively 
related to support for political violence.
Study 3: Humiliation and Support for Political Compromise
In Study 3 we tested two propositions regarding the inertia eﬀ ect of humilia-
tion: ﬁ rst, that humiliation would also decrease support for rational compro-
mises to political conﬂ ict (in Study 3a); and second, that adding instrumental 
beneﬁ ts to compromise would not reduce the inertia eﬀ ect but rather that 
symbolic actions by an out-group (such as recognition of wrongdoing and 
apologies) would decrease feelings of humiliation and thus increase support 
for political compromise (in Study 3b).
Th ese scenarios were integrated in the survey of Palestinian students described 
in Study 2. Participants all responded to peace deals in two scenarios (see Ginges 
et al. (2007) for a full description of each deal) and were randomly assigned, 
using a between subjects design, to a taboo, taboo+, or symbolic deal. In Scenario 
1, the peace deal involved Palestinian recognition of the legitimacy of the Jewish 
state in return for: (i) their own state in 99% of the West Bank and Gaza (taboo 
deal), (ii) their own state plus ﬁ nancial compensation (taboo+ deal), or (iii) their 
own state plus Israeli recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian state and 
an Israeli apology to Palestinians (symbolic deal). In Scenario 2, the peace deal 
involved Palestinians renouncing sovereignty over East Jerusalem in return for: 
(i) their own state in the West Bank and Gaza (taboo deal), (ii) their own state 
plus ﬁ nancial compensation (taboo+ deal), or (iii) their own state plus Israeli 
symbolically renouncing their sovereignty over the West Bank (symbolic deal).
After hearing the peace deal randomly assigned to them, participants were 
asked to nominate the, “feelings/emotions that come to mind when thinking 
about this deal”. Th e choices were: humiliation, disgust, sadness, pride, anger, 
guilt, happiness, satisfaction or neutral. Participants were then given two indi-
rect measures (to avoid posturing) of support and opposition to the peace deal. 
Our indirect measures were designed to take advantage of the false-consensus 
eﬀ ect (Marks and Miller, 1987). Th e ﬁ rst measure asked participants to esti-
mate the percentage of Palestinians who would vote for each deal, the second 
measure asked participants to estimate the percentage of Palestinians who 
would support a campaign of suicide bombings (in Scenario 1) or would mar-
tyr themselves (in Scenario 2) to oppose the deal.
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Results: Study 3a
For both scenarios we regressed support for the peace deals and for violent oppo-
sition to those deals respectively on whether participants expressed humiliation 
in response to the deals while controlling for gender, age, income, education 
levels, refugee status, area of residence (West Bank or Gaza) expressions of anger 
or disgust at the peace deal and identiﬁ cation with Hamas or Fatah. In Scenario 
1, participants who felt humiliated by the deal reported lower willingness to vote 
for it (humiliation ﬁ rst versus no humiliation, B = −14.46, SE = 2.17, t = −6.65, 
P <0.0001; humiliation second versus no humiliation, B = −9.13, SE = 2.6, t = 
−3.48, P =0.001). Similar results were found for Scenario 2 (humiliation ﬁ rst 
versus no humiliation, B = −10.28, SE = 2.03, t = −5.332, P <0.0001; humilia-
tion second versus no humiliation, B = −2.825, SE = 2.22, t = −1.28, P = 0.203). 
Notably, experiences of humiliation were again unrelated to support for violent 
opposition to the peace deals (all not signiﬁ cant).
Results: Study 3b
Here we investigated (i) whether symbolic gestures may increase positive atti-
tudes towards peace deals and (ii) whether this eﬀ ect would be mediated by 
fewer expressions of humiliation in response to the Israeli symbolic gesture. In 
Scenario 2, there was no reliable eﬀ ect of experimental condition on predicted 
support for the deals. Th us we could only test the predicted mediation role of 
humiliation in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, the mean percentage of Palestinians 
predicted to vote for deals was 38.26 (SD = 24.91). Compared to the taboo 
condition, added material incentives to compromise in the taboo+ condition 
neither inﬂ uenced predicted levels of support for the peace deal (P=0.74) nor 
whether the deal was experienced as humiliating (P=0.54). However, as pre-
dicted, symbolic Israeli compromises over Israeli sacred values resulted in 
increased Palestinian support for peace deals involving painful compromise 
over Palestinian sacred values, an eﬀ ect that was mediated by a reduction in 
humiliation caused by the Israeli symbolic compromise (see Figure 1). Pales-
tinians responding to the peace deal including the Israeli symbolic compro-
mise were less likely, by a factor of 0.41, to nominate humiliation as their ﬁ rst 
emotional response to the deal (SE = 0.216, Wald = 17.07, P < 0.001) and 
showed greater support for the peace deal (SE = 2.34, t = 2.26, P = 0.024). 
When support for the peace deal was simultaneously regressed on experimen-
tal condition and humiliation, experimental condition no longer signiﬁ cantly 
predicted support (SE = 2.33, t = 1.59, p > 0.11), while humiliation negatively 
predicted support for the peace deal (SE = 2.09, t = −4.36, P<0.0001; Sobel 
test for mediation = 3.0, P = 0.0027).
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Summary
Palestinians who felt humiliated by peace deals involving compromises over 
Palestinian sacred values showed less support for those deals, although they did 
not show greater support for violent opposition to those deals. In Scenario 1, 
a deal including a parallel Israeli compromise over one of their sacred values 
led to decreased feelings of humiliation which in turn caused increased sup-
port for the deal, while added instrumental beneﬁ ts had no positive eﬀ ect on 
willingness to accept compromise.
Discussion
We investigated the proposed inertia eﬀ ect of humiliation and its inﬂ uence on 
inter-group conﬂ ict. In studies that either measured or manipulated humiliat-
ing experiences of Palestinians in the context of the Israeli occupation, the 
experience of humiliation did not cause an increased propensity for violent 
reactions to the Israeli occupation. Instead, it led to apparent inertia: humilia-
tion was typically negatively related to cognitive and emotional support for sui-
cide attacks against Israelis and was never positively related to such support.
Figure 1. Test of the mediation hypothesis. All peace deals involved the same 
Palestinian compromise over their own sacred value in exchange for a two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict.
B = −.893
Experimental condition 
Peace deal including 
(versus not including) 
symbolic compromise of 
Israeli sacred value
Humiliation 
Whether Palestinians 
reported “humiliation” as 
their ﬁrst emotional 
response to peace deal
Support for peace deal 
Predicted percentage of 
Palestinians who would vote 
for the peace deal
B = 3.7 (5.27)
B = −.9.11
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It is interesting to juxtapose these empirical ﬁ ndings with reports of Pales-
tinian and Islamic militants who frequently attribute their own actions to 
identity based experiences of humiliation. As is common in other domains 
where people do a poor job of understanding the cause of their own actions 
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), it appears that these self-attributions may be 
inaccurate. Possibly those involved in violent rebellion witness the frequent 
humiliation of others who they identify with, but experience this as either an 
insult or as threatened humiliation without internalizing the experience as 
humiliating (Khosrokhavar, 2006). In this way they avoid the inertia eﬀ ect 
and instead respond with moral outrage and with a propensity for violence 
(Sageman, 2007). A related possibility is that there may be some type of 
“rebound” eﬀ ect of humiliation: those who are humiliated may become less 
rebellious or violent, but if they are subsequently “empowered” by charismatic 
leaders or ideologies they might react with greater violence to avenge the insult 
of their previously humiliated state. Investigations of these possibilities may be 
a fruitful topic for future empirical research.
Th e inertia eﬀ ect of humiliation also appears to suppress mutually beneﬁ -
cial inter-group compromise. Experiencing peace deals that involved compro-
mise over a sacred value as humiliating decreased willingness to support these 
deals. Importantly, we found that feelings of humiliation caused by being 
asked to consider such peace deals were reduced, not by material incentives, 
but when the out-group made a simultaneous, parallel compromise over one 
of their own sacred values leading to increased support for the peace deal. Th is 
ﬁ nding opens up a particularly intriguing and important line of future research 
focusing on two issues. First, what types of reciprocal symbolic compromises 
are necessary to reduce the humiliating eﬀ ect of compromising sacred values? 
In this study we found that a combination of recognition and apology had a 
signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect. We do not know whether this combination is necessary, or 
whether one of these aspects (e.g., apology) was suﬃ  cient. Second, we need 
to know more about the timing of symbolic gestures, whether they need to 
be simultaneous to be eﬀ ective, or whether unilateral symbolic compromise 
might decrease the sense of humiliation felt by the other side, thus opening 
the way to peaceful conﬂ ict resolution.
Humiliation is an important feature of many inter-group conﬂ icts, yet it 
has been a relatively neglected topic for empirical research. Th is study demon-
strates that humiliation produces an inertia eﬀ ect that, at least in the short 
term, dampens prospects of violent insurgency and also paradoxically reduces 
support for mutually beneﬁ cial compromises. Our ﬁ ndings demonstrate how 
a greater understanding of inertia eﬀ ect may reveal methods for facilitating 
mutually beneﬁ cial compromises to a wide variety of inter-group conﬂ icts.
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